Abstract-Presently several marketplace applications over online social networks are gaining popularity. An important class of applications is online market exchange of items. Examples include peerflix.com and readitswapit.co.uk. We model this problem as a social network where each user has two associated lists. The item list consists of items the user is willing to give away to other users. The wish list consists of items the user is interested in receiving. A transaction involves a user giving an item to another user. Users are motivated to transact in expectation of realizing their wishes. Wishes may be realized by a pair of users swapping items corresponding to each other's wishes, but more generally by means of users exchanging items through a cycle, where each user gives an item to the next user in the cycle, in accordance with the receiving user's wishes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of social networks is rapidly growing due to the recent emergence of online social networks like MySpace and Facebook. Users are spending increasing amounts of time on social network websites. For instance, a recent survey [1] that ranks websites based on average time spent by a user, identifies MySpace and Facebook among the top 10 websites, with MySpace standing at the top with 11.9 percent of people's time. One important example of social interaction among users on the Internet is online exchange markets which are currently present on the web. Some examples are as follows:
• peerflix.com [2] for exchanging movies: It lets the users exchange their DVDs with each other instead of renting them.
• readitswapit.co.uk [3] allows book lovers to exchange their already read books and receive new books in return. Almost all of the "matching" (i.e., finding books and owners to exchange with) is done manually by the user herself, i.e., she has to go and find her desired book in a library and then mark it. The owner of the desired book will be informed by an email and will check the seeker's list of books and if willing to do the exchange, they will post the books to each other.
• oddshoe.org: [4] is a national organization which is a resource for new, quality single shoes and pairs of significantly different sizes. Many have this need due to injury, disease and genetic disorders. This organization has been around since 1943 and the exchanges are not done online.
• Intervac International is a world-wide non-profit organization which has facilitated home exchanges between its members since 1953. They operate a multi-language realtime database of home exchange listings on their website with an option to receive printed catalogues of listings. Other than the above examples for exchange markets, various marketplaces for exchanging items can be designed as new applications over online social networks on the web. This can be already seen to be happening over Facebook.
Motivated by the above, we study optimal "matching" algorithms for online exchange markets. Here, by "matching", we mean finding a set of users and items such that they can exchange items in a cycle of length two or more.
1 A main motivation behind our work is the lack of comprehensive and efficient recommendation algorithms for item exchange in the current systems. These algorithms can improve the quality of user experience in exchange markets, and in turn, they can make various ways of monetizing such systems, such as online advertising, more effective.
In this paper we focus on the problem of generating recommendations under two models: deterministic model and probabilistic model. In both models each user receives an item in return for the item which she gives away. We formulate the problem of finding recommendations as that of finding a set of conflict-free cycles in the graph. Conflict-free means no user is allowed an opportunity to exchange the same item in different cycles. This condition is necessary to ensure that when a user commits to a recommended exchange, she is not surprised that the recommended item is already taken. Thus, a recommendation consists of a set of conflict-free cycles. The value of a recommendation is the number of items (potentially) exchanged through the cycles recommended. When the cycle length is restricted to two, we call the corresponding problem simple exchange markets. In a simple exchange market, the only acceptable recommendation is a set of (conflict-free) swaps, called a swap recommendation. We prove the surprising result that even finding an optimal swap recommendation is NP-complete.
Next, we consider a more general situation where exchanges occur through short cycles, i.e., cycles of length up to k, where k is a small predetermined constant. We typically consider k = 2, ..., 5. We call this exchange markets with short cycles. Now, a recommendation is a set of conflict-free cycles with length bounded by k. Of course, the hardness extends to finding optimal recommendations for this case.
Finally, we consider the probabilistic exchange market. In this case, there is a probability associated with each user engaging in a transaction with any other user. As well, there is a probability of a user being willing to trade one item for another. For simplicity, we assume all probabilities are independent. A recommendation is defined in exactly the same way as for exchange markets through short cycles. The value of a recommendation is the expected number of items exchanged. The contribution of a cycle to the value of a recommendation is the number of items exchanged in the cycle multiplied by the product of all probabilities associated with the cycle. We show that finding an optimal recommendation remains NP-complete.
We develop heuristic and approximation algorithms for finding optimal recommendation for all three kinds of markets. We discuss three approximation algorithms -Greedy, Local search, and combination of greedy and local search -and one heuristic algorithm -Maximal. We prove that the approximation algorithms find recommendations that are within a factor of 2k, 2k − 1, and (2k + 1)/3 of the optimal, respectively. We also analyze the complexity of the proposed algorithms. While Maximal has no provable approximation guarantees, it is by far the most efficient.
We conduct a detailed empirical study of all algorithms proposed using synthetic data that we generated. The data was generated to conform to power law distributions commonly found in social networks. Our experiments show that even though Maximal has no theoretical approximation guarantees, recommendations found by Maximal are very competitive with those found by the approximation algorithms. On the other hand, Maximal significantly outperforms the other algorithms when it comes to scalability w.r.t. network size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is described in Section II. The proposed exchange market models are described in Section III, which also formalizes and illustrates the problems studied. The complexity of the problems is analyzed in Section IV. The heuristic and approximation algorithms are developed in Section V while their analysis is discussed in Section VI. Section VII discusses the experiments. Finally, Section VIII summarizes the paper and discusses future work.
II. RELATED WORK
The related work can be classified in the three following categories: a) Cycle Covers: The cycle cover problem has been studied thoroughly. Given a graph and a subset of marked elementsnodes, edges or some combination of them-a cycle cover problem seeks to find a minimum length set of cycles whose union contains all marked elements [5] . In [5] the authors study cycle cover problem for cycles with bounded size which cover a subset of the edges of a graph. More specifically, they improve the trivial approximation factor of 2 to 1 + ln 2 in weighted graphs and O(ln k) for uniform graphs. The Chinese postman problem was introduced by Guan [6] and Edmonds and Johnson [7] proposed a polynomial-time algorithm to solve the problem in undirected graphs. Papadimitriou [8] proved that the problem is NP-hard for mixed graphs. Later, Raghavachari and Veerasamy [9] gave a 3 2 -approximation for this instance of the problem. An NP-hard [10] variant of the Chinese postman problem, the minimum weight cycle cover problem, adds the constraint that covering cycles must be simple. The bounded cycle cover problem, which constrains cycles to be of bounded size as well as simple, was introduced by Hochbaum and Olinick [11] . They presented a heuristic for the problem along with empirical analysis. b) Recommender Systems: Extensive work has been done in the area of recommender systems from different perspectives such as cognitive science [12] , approximation theory [13] , information retrieval [14] and also management science [15] . The field gained more importance in the mid 1990s with the emergence of collaborative filtering papers [16] , [17] , [18] . Recommender systems are usually classified into the following categories, based on how recommendations are made [19] :
• Content-based recommendations: The user will be recommended items similar to the ones the user preferred in the past; • Collaborative recommendations: The user will be recommended items that people with similar tastes and preferences liked in the past; • Hybrid approaches: These methods combine collaborative and content-based methods. In addition, machine learning approaches have also been developed [19] .
In addition to recommender systems that predict the absolute values of ratings that individual users would give to the yet unseen items (as discussed above), there has been work done on preference-based filtering, i.e., predicting the relative preferences of users [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] . Preference-based filtering techniques would focus on predicting the correct relative order of the items, rather than their individual ratings. c) The Kidney Exchange: A related problem in exchange markets is the national kidney exchange problem [24] . For many patients with kidney disease, the best option is to find a living donor, that is, a healthy person willing to donate one of his/her two kidneys. The problem is that frequently, a potential donor and his intended recipient are of incompatible blood-type or tissue-type. In the past, the incompatible donor was sent home, leaving the patient to wait for a deceaseddonor kidney. However, there are now a few regional kidney exchanges in the United States, in which patients can swap their willing but incompatible donors with each other, in order for each to obtain a compatible donor [24] . The kidney exchange problem is very similar to our problem, specifically the simple exchange market and the exchange market through short cycles. In kidney exchange, each patient needs one and only one kidney and each donor is willing to donate only one kidney(!). Because of medical constraints, one wants short exchange cycles. It is shown in [24] that (optimal) kidney exchange is NP-complete when exchange cycles of length ≤ k are considered, where k > 2.
If exchanges are restricted to swaps, the kidney exchange problem can be solved using the maximum weighted perfect matching problem in which given an edge-weighted bipartite graph, we are looking for a maximum weighted perfect matching. As a result, the problem will be solved polynomially. Given a network G = (V, E), a bipartite graph can be constructed as follows: put one vertex for each agent and one vertex for each corresponding item (i.e. kidney). Connect each agent to its corresponding item with an edge e v with weight zero. For each edge e ∈ E, e = (v i , v j ) in the original graph, connect agent v i to item v j with an edge with weight w e . Perfect matchings in this model are equivalent to cycle covers, because receiving an item is equal to giving an item away, and finding a maximum weighted matching solves the problem of finding an optimal set of kidney swaps.
However, in all our exchange markets, users may have multiple items in their item and wish lists and may be willing to trade more than one item at a time. This subtle difference alone makes our problem much harder. As we show later, even finding optimal swap recommendations for simple market exchange is NP-complete. d) Peer-to-peer file sharing: There has been considerable work on file sharing in peer-to-peer systems. In particular, [25] shows by simulation that exchanges as a mechanism succeed in providing incentives for users' sharing activities. [26] shows the design of the BitTorrent protocol results in a more cooperative behavior over other P2P protocols used to share similar content. Finally, [27] shows the bandwidth allocation converges to a market equilibrium when each client uploads files to a small number of its neighbors (e.g., 4) from which it receives most download, which is the typical expected behavior of a BitTorrent user.
III. MODEL
In our proposed system, we assume the algorithm for generating recommendations for exchange cycles is run periodically and the set of potential feasible exchanges are discovered. Users involved in these potential cycles are informed through email and/or their account will be updated. If they are interested in performing the transaction, they will get in touch with the other users. Otherwise they will withdraw the transaction and all other involved users will be informed. In any case when the transaction is done the exchanged items are removed from the item lists and wish lists, and the system will be updated. We also assume that a user does not own multiple copies of an item and also does not wish for multiple copies of an item.
Obviously the system is dynamic, i.e., it changes with time. The possible changes are: (i) a user joins or leaves the network; (ii) an item is added to or removed from a user's wish list or item list: this change may be due to a transaction done or due to change in user's interests.
These changes imply that the set of feasible exchanges will also change by time. Thus, the system runs the algorithm to find the set of new exchanges that have become possible periodically (e.g., once a day or a week). In this section, we formally define our problems. In the deterministic cases the objective is to maximize the number of items exchanged and in the probabilistic case to maximize the expected number of items exchanged. The following example illustrates many of the notions and will serve as a running example. In all our problems below, we assume a set of users U and a set of items I. User u ∈ U owns a set of items (aka item list) S u , and requires a set of items (aka wish list) W u .
Simple Exchange Market: In a simple exchange market, we only match up users one by one, i.e., in each exchange, two users u and v can exchange a pair of items i and j. Given a set of users U with the item lists S u and wish lists W u for each user u ∈ U , the simple market problem, denoted by SimpleM arket, is to find a set of pairs
We call each such pair a swap. The problem can be modeled as a directed graph G = (V, E) with users as nodes V and a directed edge (u, v) ∈ E labeled i whenever i ∈ S u ∩ W v , i.e., u owns item i and v is interested in receiving it. Thus, swaps correspond to cycles of length two in G. Since each user typically has one instance of an item in S u and also needs one instance from each item in W u , [(u, i), ( * , * )] should appear in the set at most once, where the first * is any other user v = u and the second * is any item. In terms of graphs, the configuration shown in Figure 2 is forbidden, i.e., the set of recommended swaps should not contain this as a subgraph. We call a recommendation, i.e., set of swaps, without such a forbidden configuration conflict-free. To see why conflict-freedom is necessary, consider recommending both pairs
] to the users. If user u exchanges i for j with user v, then the recommended exchange is no longer feasible for user w. Thus, set of recommended exchanges contains a conflict. The condition above ensures it is conflictfree. Conflict-free recommendations ensure that users do not get turned off or lose their trust in their system by finding out that a recommendation they received from the system is no longer feasible. In our running example (Example 3.1), Joe can give away B 2 to both Amy and Alice, but both edges cannot be in the graph at the same time. Exchange Markets through Short Cycles. In an online exchange market, we can find cycles of size larger than 2. E.g., as seen in Figure 3 , users Alice, Bob and Amy have items B 7 , B 4 , and B 8 in their item lists respectively. If Alice, Bob and Amy have items B 8 , B 7 , and B 4 respectively in their wish lists, we can set up a 3-way exchange among them and have all of them satisfy their wishes. Note that, in this example, if we restrict ourselves to swaps, none of the users may be satisfied. Formally, an exchange cycle is a sequence
, where j ⊕ 1 = j + 1, 1 ≤ j < k, and k ⊕ 1 = 1. A set of exchange cycles is said to be conflict-free provided the pattern [(u, i), ( * , * )] appears at most once in the set, i.e., the corresponding graph does not contain the forbidden subgraph in Figure 2 . Our goal is to find an optimal set of conflict-free cycles: The objective is to maximize the number of items involved in exchanges, thus maximizing the number of transactions. Furthermore, in practice, we may wish to limit the length of the exchange cycles to a maximum of k, where k is some predetermined constant. We usually consider k = 2, ..., 5.
In our running example, we can see that Alice has B 7 in her item list and Bob has it in his wish list. Bob has B 4 in his item list and Amy has wished for that book. At the same time B 8 in Amy's item list while Alice is interested in B 8 .
As we see the cycle [(Alice, B 7 ), (Bob, B 4 ), (Amy, B 8 )] is a feasible cycle.
Probabilistic exchange markets. Formalizing the above problem in a probabilistic setting, we assume, e.g., using a reputation system, that the probability of realizing each exchange in the exchange market graph is estimated. Assuming that the probability of realizing each edge is independent of other edges, our goal is to find a set of cycles with the maximum expected number of edges covered, since each edge corresponds to an item being exchanged. Note that the probability of a cycle is the product of the probability of its edges. It would be interesting to understand the complexity of this problem. Let P u (v) denote the probability that u is willing to do an exchange with user v, and let Q u (i, j) be the probability that user u will exchange item i with item j, i.e., she gives i and takes j. In this case, the probability of a cycle being realized will be
. Our goal is to find a set of conflict-free cycles that maximize the total expected number of items exchanged.
Example 3.2: [Probabilistic Exchange Market] Consider Figure 3 as an example. Let the probabilities associated with the edges (Alice, Joe), (Joe, Amy) and (Amy, Alice) be 0.7, 0.55 and 0.9. For simplicity, suppose the probability of a user trading any item for any other is 1. Then the probability of this cycle being realized will be 0.7 × 0.55 × 0.9 = 0.3465. Let R be a recommendation including this exchange cycle among others. Then the contribution of this cycle to the value of R, i.e., to the expected number of exchanged items is 3 × 0.3465 = 1.0395.
In almost all of the cases, the probability of each edge being realized is less than one, so when the cycle gets larger, the probability would be very low. Therefore (similar to what we argued before for the deterministic case) in the probabilistic case short cycles are practically more appealing.
IV. HARDNESS RESULTS
In this section, we show that the SimpleM arket problem is NP-complete. We also show that the P robMarket problem is NP-complete, regardless of whether we consider swaps or short cycles with length bounded by a constant k > 2. Even the "kidney exchange version" of P robMarket where every user owns only one item and wishes for only one item remains NP-complete when cycles of length > 2 are allowed. We first define the decision versions of these problems formally.
SimpleM arket Decision Problem
Instance: A set of users U with the item lists S u and wish lists W u for each user u ∈ U . Question: Does ∃ a conflict-free swap cover C with number of items exchanged ≥ K?
The simple market decis version, Prob usr associates with every user a probability that she will transact with any user. Prob itm associates with each user and a pair of items i, j, a probability that the user will give i and take j in exchange.
P robMarket Problem
Instance: A set of users U with the item lists S u and wish lists W u for each user u ∈ U and two probability assignment functions Prob usr :
Question: Does ∃ a cycle cover C whose expected number of items is ≥ K?
We next define T riEdgeP art, a well-known NP-complete problem. We will reduce this problem to our problem.
T riEdgeP art Problem
Instance: A tripartite graph G with three vertex partitions (X, Y, Z) and an edge set
Does ∃ an edge partitioning of G into disjoint sets of cycles of size three?
Finally, we define 4CycEdgeP art, a problem involving 4-partite graphs. We will find it convenient to use this problem as an intermediary in our reductions. We first show that the 4CycEdgeP art problem is NPcomplete and then give a reduction from 4CycEdgeP art to SimpleM arket.
Theorem 1: The 4CycEdgeP art problem is NP-complete. Proof: The membership in NP is straightforward: given an edge partitioning P of G, we can check in polynomial time whether P consists of 4-cycles that are pairwise edge-disjoint, covering all edges of G. To prove the hardness, we give a reduction from T riEdgeP art. The triangle edge-partitioning of tripartite graphs is known to be NP-complete (and in fact APX-hard) by a result of Abraham et. al [28] , following an NP-completeness by Holyer [29] .
Given an instance
art as follows: for any vertex w ∈ Z, we add two corresponding vertices w 1 ∈ I and w 2 ∈ J ; for each u ∈ X, we add a vertex u ∈ X ; and for any v ∈ Y , we add a vertex v ∈ Y . In other words, we let
that is, we choose X , Y to be any sets with size |X|, |Y |, and I and J to be any sets with size |Z|, X , Y , I , J being pairwise disjoint. Then, we construct edges E (G ) of the new instance as follows: for any edge (u, v) ∈ E(G) where u ∈ X and v ∈ Y , we add an edge (u , v ) to E (G ); for any edge (u, w) ∈ E(G) where u ∈ X and w ∈ Z, we add an edge (u , w 1 ) to E (G ); and for any edge (v, w) ∈ E(G) where v ∈ Y and w ∈ Z, we add an edge (v , w 2 ) to E (G ). Finally, we add
edges between every pair w 1 ∈ I and w 2 ∈ J (corresponding to a vertex w ∈ Z). Note that deg(w) is even in our case, otherwise it is clear that there is no triangle partitioning. The reason that we put deg(w) 2 edges is that there may be more than one triangle passing through w ∈ Z, and each triangle corresponds to two edges for passing through any node, therefore to maintain the same number of cycles in the 4-partite graph, we need to connect w 1 and w 2 with
is an instance of the 4CycEdgeP art problem. It should also be noted that while instances of the T riEdgeP art are always simple graphs, instances of the 4CycEdgeP art can be multigraphs since we need multiple edges between w 1 and w 2 , for various w ∈ Z. However, they are not arbitrary multigraphs: e.g., between x ∈ X and y ∈ Y at most one edge is required (see the formal definition of the 4CycEdgeP art decision problem above). 1 y 1 z 1 
. For each triangle x i y i z i in this edgepartitioning T where x i ∈ X, y i ∈ Y , and z i ∈ Z, we associate a corresponding 4-cycle x y z 1 z 2 in G where x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and z 1 ∈ I , and z 2 ∈ J . Since the edges of the p triangles (x i y i z i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ p cover all edges of G, each vertex z ∈ Z appears exactly in
triangles. Let T be the set of corresponding 4-cycles to triangles in T . Thus, there are exactly
4-cycles in T corresponding to triangles in T , and as a result, T is also an edge-partitioning of G into edgedisjoint 4-cycles. Now, consider an edge-partitioning T of G into edge-disjoint 4-cycles. Similar to the above construction, we can construct a set T of triangles partitioning the edges of G to p edge-disjoint triangles. The above two facts show that there exists an edge-partitioning of edges of G to edgedisjoint triangles if and only if there exists an edge-partitioning of G to edge-disjoint 4-cycles. This completes the proof of hardness.
We next show: Theorem 2: The SimpleM arket problem is NP-complete. Proof: Once again, membership in NP is straightforward: given a set of swaps, it is easy to check whether it is conflictfree and the number of items covered is ≥ K. To prove the hardness, we give a reduction from 4CycEdgeP art to the SimpleM arket problem.
Given an instance G(X ∪ Y ∪ I ∪ J, E) of the 4CycEdgeP art problem, we construct an instance Σ of the simple marketing problem as follows: we let the set of users be X ∪ J, and the set of items be I ∪ Y . For each user x ∈ X, we set the item list of x to S x = {i ∈ I | (x, i) ∈ E(G)} and the wish list of x to W x = {y ∈ Y | (x, y) ∈ E(G)}. Similarly, for each user j ∈ J, we set the item list of j to S j = {y ∈ Y | (y, j) ∈ E(G)} and the wish list of j to
Now, we show that there exists an edge-partitioning of
edge-disjoint 4-cycles if and only if there exists a conflict-free set of p swaps between pairs of users in the instance Σ of the simple market exchange problem. Consider an edge-partitioning T of G into p edge-disjoint 4-cycles
, and j v ∈ J. Consider the corresponding possible swap where x v gives item i v to user j v and receives item y v in return from j v . By the construction of item and wish lists, this swap is feasible. Let S be the set of swaps derived from T . Clearly |S| = p. We show S is conflict-free. Suppose not. Then there is a pair of swaps in S of the form: user a swaps item α for item β with user b and a also trades α for item γ with user c (which may or may not be b). This implies T contains two 4-cycles which share the edge (a, α), a contradiction to the edge-disjointness of T . Now, suppose S is any conflict-free set of p swaps for the instance Σ. We construct an edge-disjoint 4-cycle cover T as follows. For every swap where user a trades α for β with user b, choose the corresponding 4-cycle (a, α, b, β, a) . It is easy to show T covers all edges of G and it is pairwise edge-disjoint. This completes the reduction and the proof.
We next turn our attention to the P robMarket problem. The following restricted versions are particularly interesting. First, what can we say about P robMarket when we restrict attention to swaps, i.e., when we are interested in finding an optimal conflict-free set of swaps? The hardness for the corresponding deterministic case implies the probabilistic version is hard as well. In particular, the deterministic version is a special case when all probabilities are set to 1. Second, suppose every user owns just one item and wishes for just one item. This is similar to the kidney exchange problem and we call it the "kidney exchange version" of P robMarket. If exchange cycles with length more than two are allowed, by the result of [24] , it follows that this problem is NP-complete. When only swaps are allowed, the same technique of finding maximum weighted perfect matching can be used to solve this problem exactly in polynomial time. We thus have:
Lemma 1: Finding an optimal set of swaps for P robMarket is in general NP-complete. However, for the kidney exchange version, the problem can be solved in polynomial time. Finding an optimal conflict-free set of exchange cycles where cycle length is bounded by k > 2 for the kidney exchange version of P robMarket is NP-complete.
V. THE ALGORITHMS
In this section, we develop four algorithms for variants of the exchange market problem. Three of them have provable approximation bounds w.r.t. the optimal solution. The remaining one is a heuristic algorithm with no such guarantees. However, as we will see shortly, it is much more efficient than the approximation algorithms. While theoretically the heuristic algorithm may not sound interesting compared to the approximation ones, we study their relative performance on synthetically generated data sets in Section VII.
Some of these algorithms are inspired by algorithms for the set packing problem. In section VI, we define the weighted k-set packing problem and show that the exchange market problem can be reduced to a special case of the weighted kset packing problem. We exploit this connection to derive the approximation bounds.
In the rest of the paper, we will find it convenient to deal with a graph representation of market exchange problems. Given a (simple or short-cycles) market exchange problem instance Σ = (U, I,
with users U , items I, item lists S u and wish lists W u , the corresponding graph representation G Σ is defined as follows. G Σ is a directed edge-labeled graph and has a node for every user in U . There is a directed edge (u, v) labeled i whenever i ∈ I is an item such that i ∈ S u ∩ W v . For our running example of Example 3.1, the corresponding graph is shown in Figure 5 .
A. Finding a maximal set of cycles
One heuristic algorithm is to look for a maximal set of cycles in G Σ . S is a maximal set of cycles if S is conflictfree and there exists no cycle C in G Σ which does not appear in S and does not conflict with any cycle in S. 9 , B 2 , B 3 } . Both are maximal since no cycles can be added to either without breaking the conflictfreedom property. Furthermore, notice that coverage(S 1 ) ⊆ coverage(S 2 ) and coverage(S 2 ) ⊆ coverage(S 1 ). However, S 1 is clearly not optimal since S 2 covers strictly more items.
In order to find the maximal set of cycles, we first initialize the set of cycles B to ∅. Then for a random node v ∈ V (G) we perform a breadth first search (BFS) or a depth first search (DFS) from v to find a cycle. While performing the BFS/DFS the first time that we encounter a backward edge we can stop because a cycle has been found. BFS will find the shortest cycle. And terminate if no cycles are found. Add C to B, and remove all edges that are in conflict with C from the graph. Set C to ∅ again and start the BFS from another node. We repeat this procedure M times and select the result with maximum weight. In Section VII, we explore the performance of this algorithm for different choices of M . The complete description of Algorithm Maximal is depicted in Figure 6 . 
B. Greedy Algorithm
Another approach is to perform a greedy algorithm. Initialize B to ∅. At each step find the best exchange cycle C with the maximum weight. In order to find the best cycle, we should try all short cycles and then pick the cycle with maximum weight. Then add C to the set of cycles B. Remove all the edges that are in conflict with C. Add C to B and if no cycles are found terminate. The complete description of Algorithm Greedy is depicted in Figure 7 .
Algorithm Greedy: 1) Construct a graph G from the exchange market instance.
2) Initialize the set of cycles B to be the empty set.
3) While there exists a cycle in graph G: a) Find an exchange cycle C of size at most 2k with the maximum weight in graph G. b) Add cycle C to the set of cycles B. c) Remove edges of C and all other conflicting edges of C from graph G.
Fig. 7. Description of the Greedy Algorithm

C. Local Search Algorithm
In this algorithm we attempt to replace a small subset of the current solution by some set of cycles that result in a greater total weight. Let the current solution be B. For any exchange cycle C that is not already selected, try to add C and remove all the conflicting edges. If the total weight of B increases by a factor β, add C to B and update B by removing all conflicting cycles from B. Do this procedure until no local improvement is possible, output B and terminate. The complete description of Algorithm Local Search is depicted in Figure 8 .
Algorithm Local Search:
1) Construct a graph G from the exchange market instance.
3) At each step a) Let the current set of cycles be B. b) For any exchange cycle C that is not already picked, i) Try to add C, and remove all cycles in B in conflict with C. ii) If the total weight of B increases, add C to B and remove all conflicting cycles from B. c) If no local improvement is possible, output B and terminate. 
D. Greedy/Local Search
Instead of starting the Local Search algorithm with an empty set, we can seed it with a good set of cycles. A variant is to run the greedy algorithm to find a set of cycles B and then run the local search algorithm starting from cycles in B. Analysis of this variant is presented in Section VI.
VI. ANALYSIS A. Performance
In order to prove approximation factors for the algorithms proposed in this paper we link our problems to the weighted k-set packing problem. We show that the simple market exchange problem can be reduced to a special case of the weighted k-set packing problem. Note that the purpose of this formulation is solely for the purpose of deriving approximation bounds.
In the weighted k-set packing problem, given a collection of sets, each of which has an associated weight and contains at most k elements drawn from a finite base set, our goal is to find a collection of disjoint sets of maximum total weight. The restriction to sets of size at most k properly includes multi-dimensional matching, which is a generalization of the ordinary graph matching problem. Weighted k-set packing is proved to be NP-hard for any k ≥ 3, even in the unweighted case [30] , and heuristics and approximation algorithms have been developed for this problem.
To reduce the simple exchange market problem to a special case of the set packing problem, we define the elements of the sets to consist of the user, the item, and the act of giving or wishing. The reduction is as follows:
First, enumerate all exchange cycles of length ≤ k. This can be done in polynomial time since k is a constant. Construct a set corresponding to every exchange cycle. To illustrate, consider an exchange cycle where user u gives item i to user v and wishes item j in return. The elements of the set are: (u gives i) denoted by x u,i ; (v gives j) be denoted by x v,j ; (u wishes j) be denoted by y u,j ; (v wishes i) be denoted by y v,i .
Thus, the set corresponding to the above exchange is
In the above notation, x is a symbol for "giving an item" and y for "wishing an item". The first term in the subscript shows the user involved in gives/wishes relation and the second term is the item being exchanged.
Set the weight of each set constructed to be the cardinality of the set. For a probabilistic variant, set the weight to be the cardinality times the product of probabilities associated with the exchange cycle. Let w(C) denote the weight of a cycle (equivalently, set) C.
In each of the exchange problems, our objective is to find a conflict-free set of exchange cycles B such that Σ C∈B w(C) is maximized. This exactly corresponds to weighted k-set packing.
We proved in Section IV that the simplest case of our problem which is the simple marketing problem is NPcomplete. We also showed that the probabilistic exchange market problem is NP-complete. Here, using the above reduction to the k-set packing problem, we obtain approximation bounds on Algorithms Greedy, Local Search and Greedy/Local Search. The approximation bounds proved in the literature for these algorithms for weighted k-set packing carry over to our exchange problems since the latter can be seen as a special case of weighted k-set packing.
• Algorithm Maximal: It is not obvious how close the solution of this algorithm will be to the optimal solution. The reason is that the BFS algorithm is performed from an arbitrary node and picks the first cycle that is found.
• Algorithm Greedy: In [31] , the authors show that performance of a greedy approach to the weighted k-set packing problem gives us a 2k-approximation. That is, in the worst case total weight of the output would be 1 2k
of the total weight of the set of maximum weights. The factor 2k is because from the sets that are removed in each iteration, the optimal solution can contain at most 2k sets, at most one for each element of the selected set all of which are of weight at most that of our selected set. They also state that this factor cannot be improved.
• Algorithm Local Search : Using a result in [32] we can show that this algorithm is a 2k − 1-approximation, meaning that in the worst case the total weight of the given solution would be 1/(2k − 1) of the total weight of the optimal solution.
• Local Search/Greedy Algorithm: In [31] the local search/greedy algorithm is proved to have a performance ratio of 2(2k + 1)/3 and that this ratio is asymptotically tight.
B. Running Time
In the following, the number of cycles that are found is depicted by |B|. The worst case running time of the proposed algorithms are as follows:
• ) . In order to check if each cycle is in conflict with the cycles in the current solution at most O(|E|) time is needed. At each step, we perform the local operation if it increases the weight of the solution by more than a 1+ factor, where is a small constant. Therefore, the number of local operations will be log 1+ OPT where OPT is the weight of the optimum solution. Thus the worst case running time for the local search algorithm will be: O(|V | 2k |E| log OPT).
• Greedy/Local Search: The running time of this algorithm simply is the addition of the greedy and local search algorithm, because the results of the greedy algorithm will be input to the local search algorithm.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented the Maximal, Greedy, and Local Search algorithms using MATLAB. The experiments were run on a Computer with a 2.16GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU and 1 GB of RAM under Windows XP.
The goals of our experiments are as follows:
• Obviously, allowing exchange cycles of length more than two will make for increased coverage of users/items. We wish to study the impact of allowing cycles of length more than two on the extent to which coverage increases.
• To examine the quality of the results found by algorithms, especially the Maximal algorithm which does not have a guaranteed approximation factor.
• To study the scalability of Algorithm Maximal and also the impact of the parameter M (number of repeated trials) on the quality of the output.
A. Data Set
We could not get access to the data of real online exchange applications. Hence, we generated a set of synthetic data. It has been shown that in many social networks, not only the node degrees but even user activities follow a power law distribution [33] . Taking this cue, it is reasonable to suppose that active users correspond to users participating in transactions and posting items to their item lists and wish lists. Thus, in our data generation, we assume that the popularity of items in wish lists and item lists follows some power law distributions, i.e., there are many items which are wished for or provided by a small number of people, and there is a small number of items which are provided or wished for by many people. To achieve this goal, first, we generate some power law distributions with a given power as the parameter. We actually examined four different powers of 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2. We use one of these power law distributions for the popularity of the items, i.e., the number of people who own one item. We generate a set of item list sizes based on some other power law vectors (this is justified by the fact that the size of wish lists and item lists should also follow some power law distribution). We also generate a vector of wish list size in direct correlation with the vector of item list sizes. The intuition here is that if a user provides more items, then probably she has larger wish lists as well. This intuition is not true in all cases, so we add some noise to this process with a small probability. Now, given a popularity vector, and the two vectors of the wish list and item list sizes, we generate the real wish lists and item lists as follows. For each item to be added to an item list or wish list, we generate an item independently from the popularity vector. This process ensures that the expected number of appearances of items in item lists and wish lists follow some power law distribution.
B. Experiments
In order to achieve our experimental goals above, we performed the following experiment. First we just considered cycles of length two (l = 2) and observed the number of items involved in cycles. In the next steps we allow cycles of length three (l = 3), four (l = 4) and then five (l = 5) and measured the increase in the number of items covered compared to the previous cases. We didn't go beyond l = 5 since as mentioned in Section III long cycles are not of interest in the market exchange problems studied in this paper. We ran our algorithms on three different data sets with 10, 000, 25, 000 and 50, 000 users. Table I summarizes the results of the algorithms in form of average amount of increase in coverage as the allowed cycle length is increased from 2 to 5. It is interesting to note that the extent of incremental coverage drops as the allowed cycle length l is increased from 2to5. This is consistent for all three algorithms. This can be explained by the small world phenomenon of networks following power law distributions. Beyond a certain length, cycles of longer length tend to pay "diminishing returns" in terms of %increase in the coverage. The figures in the table correspond to the data set of size 10, 000, averaged over various α = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, where α is the power in the power law distribution. We observed little variance over different values of α. Figures 9, 10 and 11 illustrate results of the experiments for maximal, greedy and local search algorithms respectively. In all figures, "size of data set" refers to the number of users.
First, for any of the algorithms, the number of items covered for any fixed value of l decreases as the skew factor α increases. E.g., in Figure 9 , at α = 0.5 and l = 4, about 50, 000 items are covered by the recommendations generated by Algorithm Maximal on the data set of size 25, 000. On the same data set and l, at α = 2.0, this number drops to about 15, 000. The same trend can be observed in the plots for other algorithms. The reason this happens is as the data is more skewed, fewer users own or wish for any reasonable number of items. Thus, the number of users who can engage in fruitful exchanges decreases which in turn brings down the number of items covered.
Second, while theoretically, Algorithm Maximal does not enjoy any provable approximation guarantees, the quality of its output is comparable to that of the other algorithms. E.g., consider Figures 9, 10, and 11 and examine the number of items covered by the algorithms for the following situation: l = 4 and α = 1, 1.5, and data set size = 25, 000. For α = 1.0, the maximal algorithm achieves a coverage of about 60, 000 items whereas both greedy and local search achieve about 65, 000. Similarly, for α = 1.5, maximal achieves about 35, 000 compared to about 41, 000 achieved by both greedy and local search.
Next, Figure 13 compares the average of the running times of the algorithms. The figure shows the running times averaged over various values of α. As expected, the running time of the Maximal algorithm is much better than that of the two other algorithms. Taken together with the fact that the quality of the output of Algorithm Maximal is found to be comparable to that of the other algorithms, this makes it a serious contender for finding a conflict-free set of exchange cycles with good coverage.
Another parameter that was explored was the number of times the maximal algorithm (denoted as M in the Section V) is run in order to get a reasonable result quality in a reasonable time. We examined M = 20, 50, 100, 120. The results are illustrated in Figure 12 . The result quality, measured in number of items covered, improves significantly when M is increased from 20 to 50. From 50 to 100, the increase drops and finally from 100 to 120, the increase is almost negligible. We selected M = 100 in all our experiments.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we motivated online market exchange as an interesting application on social networks and proposed specific market exchange problems where users own item lists and have a list of wishes and exchange items with one another. We proposed a few exchange problems. In the deterministic case, we motivated simple market exchange where only exchanges in the form of swaps are acceptable. While for a very similar kidney exchange problem, this is solvable in polynomial time, we proved that this is NP-complete in our case. When longer exchange cycles are allowed, kidney exchange was shown to be NP-complete [24] and this extends to our setting. We also proposed a probabilistic exchange market problem where there are probabilities associated with a user engaging with another in an exchange and with exchanging one item for another. The hardness results extend to this case.
By leveraging a close connection to weighted k-set packing, we developed a heuristic algorithm (Maximal) and approximation algorithms (Greedy, Local Search, and Greedy/Local Search). Using this connection, we showed that known approximation bounds for these algorithms for wighted k-set packing carry over to our exchange market problems -both deterministic and probabilistic.
Finally, we conducted a detailed experimentation using synthetically generated data sets, comparing different algorithms on output quality and running time and studying the extent of increase in coverage as maximum cycle length is increased, as well as the impact of data skew on coverage. Our results show that while Maximal does not have provable approximation guarantees, its performance in practice may be comparable to that of the other algorithms. This is interesting given that Maximal is by far the most efficient.
Further investigation on real data sets would be valuable. Experiments involving probabilistic exchange markets are also worthy of exploration. In addition to these directions, our current work addresses exchange markets over time as well as markets which award points for giving away items which can be redeemed later when a user needs to receive items. One advantage of this model is that it allows us to award differential points for different items depending on their popularity or perceived value, whereas in the models explored in this paper all items are treated alike. 
